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Abstract 
Acknowledging the high penetration rate of mobile devices, mobile payment is 
currently a hot topic and is expected to reach the tipping point of rapid growth. For 
such a nascent market, how to run a successful mobile payment platform remains 
unanswered. Therefore, we devote this study to investigate the pricing strategy of 
proximity mobile payment. Mobile payment serves as a two-sided platform 
connecting merchants and customers. By leveraging the emergent mobile payment 
knowledge, we present a game-theoretic model featuring network externality.  In the 
short run, we find the platform will have incentives to apply “divide and conquer” 
strategy by subsidizing customers to adopt the mobile payment service at the 
beginning of the business. After the ignition, the platform then becomes profitable by 
charging per transaction fee from the merchants. In the long run, the subsidization 
strategy is suggested to be applied when the bank is not taking too much processing 
fee and leaves sufficient market share to the mobile payment platform. In terms of 
contributions to practice, this study offers a step forward of method to identify this 
promising market for mobile payment executives, financial institutes and all others 
ecosystem. 
Keywords:  Mobile payment, platform strategy, pricing strategy, game theory 
 
Introduction 
The rapid evolution of technology has affected human beings’ daily behavior and altered the methods 
of commerce. From telegraphs, telephones to nowadays mobile phones which most modern people 
claim cannot live without, communication devices have shortened the time and cost of people to interact 
with others to a blink of eye. However, mobile phone in today’s digital era is not only a communication 
device but a door to access all variety of services, including information exchange, entertainment, and 
commerce. According to Forrester (2016), more than 4.8 billion individuals were using a mobile phone 
at the end of 2016. Data from KPCB (2016) reveal that mobile devices have eclipsed desktop computers 
as the primary method of Internet access for users globally. The same report shows adults in average 
spend roughly three hours per day on a mobile device in the United States. As this enormous and 
potential growth that mobile devices present, it comes with no surprise to see that the battlefield of 
commerce has extended from e-commerce to so-called m-commerce (mobile commerce). Originally 
introduced in 1997 by Kevin Duffey at the launch of the Global Mobile Commerce Forum, e-commerce 
means “the delivery of electronic commerce capabilities directly into the consumer’s hand, anywhere, 
via wireless technology.”1 
                                                             
1  For more details, please refer to Global Mobile Commerce Forum 1997 
https://cryptome.org/jya/glomob.htm 
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As this trend evolves, Gartner (2015) predicts that revenue from m-commerce will equal 50% of all 
digital commerce in the United States by 2017. A recent World Payments report by Capgemini (2015) 
claims that an annual growth of 60.8% through 2015 as mobile devices have become common devices 
for shopping online. Nearly 80 million U.S. consumers, corresponding to half of digital buyers in the 
U.S., are expected to make purchases using mobile devices. Acknowledging the high penetration rate of 
mobile devices, mobile payment is currently a hot topic and is expected to reach the tipping point of 
rapid growth.  
Mobile payment, also referred to as mobile wallets, mobile money, or mobile money transfer, is widely 
defined as a transfer of funds in return for a wide range of services and digital or hard goods, where the 
mobile phones are involved in both the initiation and confirmation of the payment operated under 
financial regulation. The location of the payer and supporting infrastructure is not important: she may 
or may not be “mobile” or “on the move” or at a Point of Sale (POS); the money may be paid by credit 
cards or by a prepaid wallet (Pandy, 2014). Mobile payment is a new form of value transfer, similar to 
other payment instruments that consumers can use. However, it relies more on the advanced features 
of mobile phones and the tokenization of a consumer’s financial credentials. 
Based on the location of firms and consumers, mobile payment may be remote or proximity. By 
adopting remote mobile payment, the parties and entities involved in the authorization and transaction 
process are not physically close to each other. As remote mobile payment has been established in the e-
commerce market for years, its market structure and architecture are relatively mature. In contrast, 
thanks to the modern wireless communication technology, proximity mobile payment lets consumers 
use their phones to pay for goods or services at a physical POS or with a mobile POS device at the 
merchant.2 According to PwC (2016), in 2014, the transaction volume in the global proximity mobile 
payment market was valued at $4.6 billion and it is expected to exceed $300 billion by 2020, with a 5-
year CAGR of 85.9%.   
Mobile payment ecosystem is diverse and complex. Many different kinds of firms are involved, ranging 
from mobile network operators (MNOs) and financial institutions to software and hardware providers. 
Therefore, inter-firm collaboration is especially crucial for the development and commercialization of 
this new market. However, the conflicting interests and different roles played by the firms in the system 
make it hard to reach a universal agreement on a new market architecture. This leads to a variety of 
models of mobile payments platform, differentiated by technology implementation (NFC, QR Codes), 
location (remote or proximity), and various stakeholders (financial institutions, mobile network 
operators, phone providers, regulators) each with their own motivations, expectations and capabilities 
(Dennehy and Sammon, 2015; Pandy, 2014). 
For a promising payment services markets with a history of numerous tried and failed solutions, how 
to run a successful proximity mobile payment platform remains unanswered (Dahlberg et al., 2008b). 
Therefore, we devote this study to investigate a business model of proximity mobile payment, whose 
development is currently still constraint by technology of end devices and immature market policies. 
Mobile payment serves as a two-sided platform connecting merchants and customers. As a platform, 
successful ignition relies on it installed base, and user benefit of using the platform increases as the 
number of users increases. This is known as the so-called positive cross-side network externality, which 
is the extra utility one earns by interacting with members at the other side of the platform. The more 
members at the other side, the more utility one gains. For a mobile payment provider, it faces the 
challenge of attracting enough merchants to provide goods and services to attract customers, and vice 
versa. To incentivize merchants and customers to adopt the mobile payment service, pricing (and 
subsidization) is obviously the key. The platform also needs to profit from the registration fees of both 
customers and merchants and transaction fee in each payment to make itself financially sustainable. 
Consequently, in this study we investigate a mobile payment platform’s pricing strategy and the impact 
of technology options. We hope our study may explain the rationale behind the selection of pricing 
strategies adopted by mobile payment platforms in industry. Moreover, we may provide a step forward 
of method to understand this new market that is full of potential.  
To this aim, we build a game-theoretic model featuring network externality and consider mobile 
payment business settings under different technologies. Game theory is a major method used in 
economics, business, and social science for modeling behaviors of interacting agents (Shapiro, 1989). 
One particular application is for studying two-sided platforms (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong, 
                                                             
2 For more details, please refer to Smart Card Alliance http://www.smartcardalliance.org. 
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2006). This research method usually focuses on looking for sets of strategies known as "solution 
concepts" or "equilibria", under a common assumption that players act rationally. The most famous of 
these is the Nash equilibrium, in which each player’s strategy represents a best response to the others’ 
strategies. Researchers analyze behaviors of players to discover economics and business insights.  
In this research, three types of players are in the market: a firm constructing the mobile payment 
platform, a group of potential consumers, and a group of potential merchants. The major purpose of 
our work is to study the profitability of feasible pricing strategies and figure out factors that affect the 
platform’s equilibrium choice. To focus on the pricing strategies of the platform and the 
interdependency between merchants and customers, we assume that the decisions of the rest of the 
players (e.g., banks) are fixed or less flexible to be changed.  
In the next section, we review some related works about mobile payment ecosystem, network externality 
and multi-sided platforms, and mobile payment platform. We then develop our model to address the 
interaction among the mobile payment platform, customers, and merchants. Our analysis and findings 
then follow.  
 
Literature Review 
Since Dahlberg et al. (2008b), several literature reviews about mobile payments have been written. 
Hedman and Henningsson (2012) set up a framework to identify the decision makers of this market 
and their roles. They point out that digitalization of payments has caused ecosystem instability by 
impacting the competitive and collaborative dimensions of ecosystems. In other words, this 
digitalization creates a new arena for competition. In the study on how nascent mobile payment markets 
emerge, Ozcan and Santos (2015) argue, as the potential partners hold dominant positions in different 
markets, cooperation between two parties are difficult and may lead to a vicious circle and potential 
markets are lost due to turf wars.  
Apart from discussion about the turf war of different players, Ondrus et al. (2015) investigate the impact 
of openness in mobile payment platform on market potential by examining openness at three levels: the 
provider, technology, and user levels. As the platform is launched, players as decision makers need to 
adopt an appropriate openness strategy to achieve the minimum market potential to support platform 
ignition and hence the likelihood of success. This study contributes to the understanding of the causes 
that have hindered the developments of mobile payments over the year, and why most mobile payment 
initiatives have failed before reaching consumers and merchants. 
The chicken-or-egg analogy is perfectly used to describe the mobile payment ecosystem challenge facing 
merchants’ and consumers’ adoption issues. The more consumers adopting the mobile payment method, 
the higher the incentives for merchants and agents to join the system. On the other hand, more 
merchants accepting mobile payment of course also attract more consumers to use it. This is called 
positive cross-side network effect. The presence of network externality is viewed as an important 
property of a “two-sided market” (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). According to Hagiu 
and Wright (2015), multi-side platforms not only enable direct interactions between two or more 
distinct sides, but also affiliate each side of the platform. In a mobile payment business model, the key 
terms of the interaction could be the pricing, consuming, and delivery of the goods or services. 
“Affiliation” is defined as users on each side consciously make platform-specific investments that are 
necessary in order for them to be able to directly interact with each other. For example, in a mobile 
payment ecosystem, the investment could be a fixed access fee (e.g., POS setup fee or registration fee of 
mobile payment platform), expenditure of resources (e.g., developing cost of applications using the 
iPhone’s APIs), or an opportunity cost (e.g., paying by cash, joining a loyalty program). These 
dimensions significantly affect the adoption of multi-sided models.  
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) propose a framework to analyze intermediation service providers’ pricing 
strategies under imperfect competition with a consideration of cross-side network externalities, and 
point out that Internet platform are mostly nonexclusive, where users are said to engage “multihoming”. 
By adopting “divide-and-conquer” strategies, where one side of the platform is subsidized (divide) and 
profits are made on the other side (conquer), users are absorbed to join in the market at the beginning 
of the business. When the market size reaches the minimum to support platform ignition, platform can 
then become profitable. Similar strategies are analyzed in model of payment card system as well (Baxter, 
1983; Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 2004). We follow this stream of literature 
to adopt game theory as our way of examining our research questions.  
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To the best of our knowledge, few research articles provide theoretical investigation on mobile payment 
and platform pricing strategy. Zhan and Qiao (2015) construct a game-theoretic pricing model of trusted 
service manager (TSM) in a mobile NFC payment industry. Chaix and Torre (2010) classify four types 
of possible economic business models according to the degree of involvement of two main partners, 
bank(s) and mobile network operator(s). Nevertheless, both studies fail to answer how the platform 
should determine its pricing or subsidization strategy by their theoretical model. Our study contributes 
to the literature by explicitly characterizing the mobile payment platform’s optimal pricing strategy by 
considering network externality.  
 
Model 
We formulate a stylized model integrating the essential features of a mobile payment platform 
considering settings under different mobile payment technologies. A mobile payment platform is a 
service offered to two parties, the customers (for each of them, she) and the merchants (for each of them, 
he), by a mobile payment platform operator. 
Customer. To join the platform, a customer pays a registration fee 𝑓𝐶 to the mobile payment platform. 
It is noted that 𝑓𝐶  is not necessarily positive since negative registration fee can be viewed as 
subsidization. After joining the platform, she may pay with her mobile phone in merchants allowing the 
service. In each transaction, an exogenous cost of using the mobile payment service 𝑐 ≥ 0 occurs. The 
value of 𝑐 is determined jointly by the easiness-to-use, security, and usefulness of the service.  
As a two-sided platform, the more merchants adopting the mobile payment method, the higher the 
incentives for customers to join the system. That is, the payment service quality depends on the number 
of merchants on the platform in equilibrium, which determines the degree of convenience to use the 
mobile payment service. Let 𝑛𝑀 be the number of merchants on the platform, we denote a customer’s 
perceived service quality by general consumption frequency ℎ(𝑛𝑀), where ℎ′(𝑛𝑀) > 0 and ℎ′′(𝑛𝑀) < 0, 
i.e., increasing the number of merchants is attractive, but the marginal attractiveness decreases. The 
shape of ℎ(𝑛𝑀) is further visualized in Figures 1 and 2. If we zoom in the beginning part of Figure 1, the 
curve can be well approximated as a straight line as shown in Figure 2. In other words, in the nascent 
market of mobile payment, the number of merchants approximately affects the customers’ willingness-
to-use linearly. Therefore, we set ℎ(𝑛𝑀) = 𝑛𝑀 in the short run and consider ℎ(𝑛𝑀) as a general concave 
function of 𝑛𝑀 in the long run. 
  
Figure 1.  𝒉(𝒏𝑴) Figure 2.  𝒉(𝒏𝑴) = 𝒏𝑴 
 
It is natural that customers differ in their willingness to use a mobile payment service. For example, 
some customers have a low value of time of going to get cash before shopping, while others may consider 
carrying coins are inconvenient and transaction speed is important. Therefore, we assume that 
customers are heterogeneous on their willingness-to-use 𝜃, which is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. The 
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net benefit obtained in a transaction is then 𝜃 − 𝑐. Suppose that a customer in expectation uses the 
mobile payment service 𝑁 > 0 times, a type-𝜃 consumer's utility in a membership period is thus 
 𝑢𝐶 = 𝑁ℎ(𝑛𝑀)(𝜃 − 𝑐) − 𝑓𝐶 , (1) 
i.e., the total amount of benefit obtained through using mobile payment 𝑁ℎ(𝑛𝑀)(𝜃 − 𝑐)  minus the 
membership fee 𝑓𝐶 per membership period.  
Merchants. Let 𝑝 > 0 be the exogenous average price of products in a mobile payment transaction. 
When a customer makes a purchase at the merchant, the merchant is charged by the mobile payment 
platform operator at a rate 𝑟𝑀 . That is, he earns only 𝑝(1 − 𝑟𝑀) in each transaction. Without loss of 
generality, we normalize 𝑝 to 1 throughout this study. We still include 𝑝 in expressions when that makes 
the exposition clearer.  
We consider merchants to be heterogeneous on their willingness to adopt mobile payment as well. Some 
merchants may believe that introducing mobile payment can speed up transactions and capture more 
transaction details for future analysis at the same time. On the contrary, some merchants just dislike 
mobile payment due to, for example, the resistance to new technology. Therefore, we denote the 
(physical or mental) cost of performing a mobile payment transaction by 𝜂, which distributes uniformly 
within 0  and 1 , to capture the heterogeneity among merchants. A merchant’s net earnings per 
transaction is thus 𝑝(1 − 𝑟𝑀) − 𝜂.  
Similar to customers, merchants have more incentive to join the platform when more customers sign 
up on the platform. Let 𝑛𝐶 be the number of customers of the mobile payment platform. There will be 
𝑁𝑛𝐶 transactions made in one membership period. Given that there are 𝑛𝑀 merchants in the market 
adopting mobile payment, each merchants will receive 
𝑁𝑛𝐶
𝑛𝑀
  transactions in expectation. Consequently, 
a type-𝜂 merchant’s utility is 
 
𝑢𝑀 =
𝑁𝑛𝐶
𝑛𝑀
(𝑝(1 − 𝑟𝑀) − 𝜂). 
(2) 
Market segmentation. A customer will join the platform if her 𝑢𝐶 ≥ 0, and a merchant will do the 
same thing if his 𝑢𝑀 ≥ 0. Thus, following our model setting, there exists a critical value 𝜃
∗ that divides 
customers into two group: A customer uses the mobile payment service if and only if her 𝜃 > 𝜃∗ . 
Similarly, we can find a critical value 𝜂∗ such that a merchant will join the platform if and only if his 
𝜂 < 𝜂∗. In our notation, this means 
 𝑛𝐶 = 1 − 𝜃
∗ and  𝑛𝑀 = 𝜂
∗ (3) 
An illustration of the market segmentation is provided in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Customer and merchant segmentation 
 
Mobile payment platform. The platform's problem is to maximize its profit  
 𝑢𝑊 = 𝑛𝐶𝑓𝐶 − 𝑛𝑀(−𝑠) + 𝑁𝑛𝐶𝑝(𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏) (4) 
where 𝑠 ≥ 0 is a system installation cost paid by the platform to include a merchant and 𝑏 ∈ [0, 1] is an 
exogenous payment processing fee rate charged by banks. A system installation cost in real world cases 
can be hardware cost such as POS device set-up fee or staff training cost to adopt new payment method. 
As we mentioned in the first section, different mobile payment techniques lead to different set-up cost. 
Payment processing fee is determined by the financial institutes. For example, in an NFC-SIM based 
system, banks are unwilling to let mobile operators keep in charge of the business and thus reflect their 
power on charging a high payment processing fee per transaction. On the contrary, in an NFC-HCE 
based system, banks charge a relatively low processing fee due t0 the absence of mobile operator, 
shortening the time to market. The platform profits from the registration fee of customers and 
transaction fee in each payment. In other words, it looks for 𝑓𝐶 and 𝑟𝑀 to maximize its profit 𝑢𝑊.  
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Throughout this study, we impose the assumption  𝑐 < 𝑝(1 − 𝑏)  to be satisfied for all b, c and p. This 
assures that the cost will not be greater than the profit from the system’s perspective. As we normalize 
𝑝 to 1, this assumption means 𝑏 + 𝑐 < 1.  
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the mobile payment platform decides the per transaction fee 
rate 𝑟𝑀 and the registration fee 𝑓𝐶. Second, each potential merchant and customer observes the fees and 
consider his or her own willingness of adopting mobile payment and decides whether to join the 
platform or not independently. The sizes of the two groups will then be realized, and the platform earns 
its profit. A list of notations is provided in Table 1. 
Decision variables 
𝑟𝑀 Merchant’s transaction fee rate  
𝑓𝐶 Customer’s registration fee 
Parameters 
𝑛𝐶 Number of customers using mobile payment 
𝑛𝑀 Number of merchants using mobile payment 
𝜃 Customer’s willingness to use mobile payment 
𝜂 Merchant’s per transaction cost of using mobile payment 
𝑁 Number of transactions of a customer in a membership period 
𝑐 Customer’s cost of using mobile payment 
𝑝 Average price of a transaction 
𝑠 System installation cost at the merchant side 
𝑏 Payment processing fee charged by banks 
ℎ(𝑛𝑀) General consumption frequency 
Table 1. List of decision variables and parameters 
 
Strategy in the Short Run 
In this section, we analyze the optimization problem of the mobile payment platform. In this section, 
we study the basic case, where ℎ(𝑛𝑀) = 𝑛𝑀 , which represents the short-run situation faced by the 
platform. In the next section, we will further discuss the model under the general consumption 
frequency ℎ(𝑛𝑀) settings in the long-run.  
We first derive the profit function of the platform. Given 𝑟𝑀  and 𝑓𝐶 , (1), (2), (3), and ℎ(𝑛𝑀) = 𝑛𝑀 
together imply that 
 𝑓𝐶 = 𝑁(1 − 𝑟𝑀)(𝜃
∗ − 𝑐) = 0    and     
𝑁𝑛𝐶 
𝑛𝑀
(1 − 𝑟𝑀 − 𝜂
∗) = 0, (5) 
where the former and latter are for the type-𝜃∗  customer’s and type-𝜂∗  merchant’s utilities to be 0, 
respectively. By solving the system, we get a unique solution of 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗ as 
 𝜃∗ =
𝑓𝐶
𝑁(1−𝑟𝑀)
+ 𝑐    and    𝜂∗ = 1 − 𝑟𝑀.  (6) 
Substituting 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗ into (4), we have the platform’s profit function as 
 𝑢𝑊 = (1 −
𝑓𝐶
𝑁(1−𝑟𝑀)
− 𝑐) ( 𝑓𝐶 + 𝑁(𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏)) − 𝑠(1 − 𝑟𝑀)  
(7) 
which is a maximization problem of a platform with decision variables 𝑓𝐶 ∈ ℝ  and 𝑟𝑀 ∈ [0,1] . The 
optimal solution of this problem is characterized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. The optimal registration fee and transaction fee rate are  
 𝑟𝑀
∗ =
1+𝑐+𝑏
2+𝑐
     and     𝑓𝐶
∗ =
𝑁𝑐
2+𝑐
(𝑏 − 1)   (8) 
Moreover, for all values of 𝑏, c, s, and N, we have 𝑟𝑀
∗ > 0  and 𝑓𝐶
∗ < 0.  
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Proposition 1 shows that it is of the platform’s best interest to adopt the “divide-and-conquer” strategy, 
as suggested by Caillaud and Jullien (2003), to subsidize customers and make profits from merchants. 
Because 𝑓𝐶
∗ < 0, a customer who uses the mobile payment service, instead of paying a registration fee 
when joining the platform, may receive coupons or discount codes from the platform as a joining gift. 
With this “promotion,” the customer then has more incentive to adopt the mobile payment service at 
the stores. In the following paragraph, this negative registration fee is termed as “subsidy” for more 
intuitive understanding, where |𝑓𝐶| is the magnitude of the subsidy. On the contrary, when transactions 
are made, the platform charges a per transaction fee rate 𝑟𝑀
∗ > 0  from the merchants to generate 
revenue. While increasing the per transaction fee rate 𝑟𝑀  discourages merchants from joining the 
platform, the platform would also increase the subsidy to customers |𝑓𝐶| to enlarge the number of 
customers and keep the platform being attractive to merchants. In fact, it can be shown that the platform 
should keep increasing 𝑟𝑀 and |𝑓𝐶| until all customers join the platform (cf. Proposition 3 below).  
As we observe in practice, there are several mobile payment platform operators come up with similar 
pricing strategies to help uptake of latest devices and increase customer acquisition and retention. 
Samsung’s latest offer gives new Samsung Pay users 20 US dollar in gift card credit after they 
successfully complete their first purchase (Grush, 2016). China UnionPay gives away lucky red packets 
(hong bao) randomly from 6 to 666 RMB to new users (Yeshb, 2016). These evidences again support 
the implementation of the subsidization strategy in the mobile payment ecosystem. 
We may plug in 𝑓𝐶
∗ and 𝑟𝑀
∗  back to (7) and obtain the platform’s equilibrium profit 
 𝑢𝑊
∗  =
1− 𝑏
2+𝑐
(𝑁 − 𝑠).   (9) 
We then inspect how the parameters affect the platform’s profit and the amounts of subsidy and 
transaction fee rate in equilibrium. The result is summarized in the next proposition and Table 2. 
Proposition 2. Under the platform’s optimal pricing plan: 
1. The profit of the mobile payment platform 𝑢𝑊  increases as each of b, c, s decreases or as N 
increases. 
2. The subsidy per customer |𝑓𝐶
∗| increases as each of c, and N increases or as b decreases. 
3. The transaction fee rate 𝑟𝑀
∗  increases as b or c increases. 
 
 𝑁 𝑏 𝑐 𝑠 
𝑢𝑤 ↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ 
|𝑓𝐶| ↗ ↘ ↗ - 
𝑟𝑀 - ↗ ↗ - 
Table 2: Parameter comparison 
 
In the first part of Proposition 2, it is indicated that the profit of mobile payment platform is better off 
when the costs of running the business are lower and customers’ adoption frequency are higher. This 
result is intuitive as the platform operator can accordingly earn more transaction fee under a greater 
market size. However, when the banks are no longer supportive and charge higher payment processing 
fee, the profitability of the platform shrinks. If the system installation cost is high, since in our model 
setting no registration fee is charged to merchants, the expense directly reflects on the mobile payment 
platform’s profit. 
We then take further look into the influences of the factors to the pricing strategy. With a greater size of 
the market (𝑁 is larger), the mobile payment platform is more willing to give away more subsidy to 
customers. Moreover, when the cost of customer using mobile payment 𝑐 is higher, or in other words, 
the user experience for adoption this payment method is lower, the amount of subsidies to customers 
should be consequently higher in order to motivate new users to join. Yet the platform then has to turn 
to the merchants and charge higher transaction fee to cover their subsidies expense. 
As for higher processing fee 𝑏 in each transaction, the platform will response by uprising the transaction 
fee rate charged from merchants. Correspondingly, only merchants with low costs will adopt the mobile 
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payment service, and thus the platform no longer needs to subsidize those customers whose willingness 
to use mobile payment is low. Hence, subsidies go down as the processing fee goes up. 
To further examine the impact of parameters on the user sizes of the platform in equilibrium, we 
substitute 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗ back into (3) and obtain the results in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. Under the platform’s optimal pricing plan: 
1. All customers use the mobile payment service, i.e., 𝑛𝐶 = 1. 
2. Some merchants do not use the mobile payment service, i.e., 𝑛𝑀 ∈ (0,1). Moreover, 𝑟𝑀 increases 
as b or c decreases. 
According to our analysis, the platform’s optimal strategy is to incentivize all the customers to join the 
platform by subsidization. As the platform profits from the merchants by charging transaction fees, 
those merchants with high costs will be excluded from the platform.  
Discussions 
The results above help explain some observed examples in practice. The wireless transmission 
technology of proximity mobile payments can be categorized into three communication protocols: NFC-
based (Near Field Communication), QR code-based, and other contactless technology such as MST-
based (Magnetic Secure Transmission). QR code method has low entry barrier compared to the others. 
Merchants can save cost by not having to invest in expensive equipment and adherence to restrictive 
rules. That is, in expression of our study, 𝑠 is low. As Proposition 2 indicates that the platform earns a 
higher profit with a lower 𝑠, it is no wonder that the QR code method is a popular form of electronic 
mobile payment adopted by many mobile payment operators.  
However, convenience brings fraudulent activities and thus the cost for customers to use the QR code 
method is relatively high. The NFC-based or MST-based method, on the other hand, provides a higher 
degree of security and allows its users to have no Internet access to make in-time transaction. 
Proposition 2 shows that higher customer cost 𝑐 leads to a higher subsidy 𝑟𝑀, which is well observed. In 
Taiwan, several new mobile payment platform operators are introduced about the same time, but the 
promotions offered by QR code-based platforms are usually deeper. “GOMAJI Pay” and “All Pay” wallet, 
for example, give every new user 100 NT dollar that can be used all stores cooperated. Meanwhile, LINE 
Pay new customers can receive not only LINE Points but also limited edition LINE stickers.  But other 
non-QR code wallet such as “T wallet” or “friDay” only offer discounts on limited stores. 
In the NFC-SIM based model, payment credential is written on the SIM card and needs authorization 
of its SIM-card provider, the MNO, to access. That is, the mobile payment service would be controlled 
by the mobile operator while banks lose their negotiation privilege in this situation. Consequently, due 
to the unwillingness of other market player to invest the nascent market, banks tend to set a high 
payment processing fee to hinder the MNOs and meanwhile invest in alternative architectures within 
their own industry. As for the embedded SE or HCE model or QR code model, financial institutions are 
allowed to negotiate the relationship with handset manufacturers or the platform operator directly and 
equally to continue to own the responsibility over financial transactions. Their payment processing fee 
is thus lower. Proposition 2 again bespeak the difficulty of NFC-SIM based model to be profitable, 
argued also by Ozcan and Santos (2015).  
Strategy in the Long Run 
In this section, we generalize the consumption frequency to ℎ(𝑛𝑀), where ℎ(𝑛𝑀) is a general concave 
function. The platform’s objective function can then be formulated as 
 𝑢𝑊 = (1 −
𝑓𝐶
𝑁ℎ(1−𝑟𝑀)
− 𝑐)(𝑓𝐶 + 𝑁(𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏))  (10) 
Through a derivation similar to that in the short run, we have the optimal amount of registration fee 
𝑓𝐶 =
𝑁
2
((1 − 𝑐)ℎ(𝑛𝑀) − (𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏)). The first-order derivative of 𝑢𝑊  with respect to the transaction fee 
rate 𝑟𝑀 under the optimal way of charging the registration fee (or giving out subsidies) is thus  
 ∂𝑢𝑊
∂𝑟𝑀
= 𝑠 +
𝑁
4(1−ℎ(𝑛𝑀)
2 𝐻(𝑟𝑀), 
(11) 
where 
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 𝐻(𝑟𝑀) = [(1 − 𝑐)ℎ(𝑛𝑀) + (𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏)][2ℎ(𝑛𝑀) + ℎ′(𝑛𝑀)((𝑟𝑀 − 𝑏) − (1 − 𝑐)ℎ(𝑛𝑀))]. (12) 
In this case, 
∂uW
∂𝑟𝑀
> 0 is not always true. Therefore, we are interested in understanding when the optimal 
in the short run, i.e., offer subsidies to include all customers and profit from merchant by setting the 
highest possible 𝑟𝑀, can still be applied. In particular, we are curious about how the shape of H affects 
the optimality of such a strategy.  
To conduct an investigation, we set ℎ(𝑛𝑀) = 𝑛𝑀
𝑡 , where 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1 , in the sequel. We first conduct 
numerical experiments to see whether 
∂uW
∂𝑟𝑀
> 0  is true for all 𝑟𝑀 ∈ [0,1]  under each parameter 
combination. The results of our experiments are illustrated below in Figure 4. For each of four different 
values of 𝑡 ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3},  we draw a curve that separate the reasonable parameter region (under 
the line 𝑏 + 𝑐 = 1 due to our assumption 𝑏 + 𝑐 < 1) into two parts. To the left of the curve, we have 
∂uW
∂𝑟𝑀
> 0; to the right of it, we do not. It can be easily observed that the region of 
∂uW
∂𝑟𝑀
> 0 enlarges as 𝑡 
increases. In other words, the strategy optimal in the short run is more likely to remain optimal in the 
long run when 𝑡 is close to 1, i.e., when 𝐻 is “not too concave”. This is trivial, as in that case the situation 
is close enough to the short run. It can also be observed that the strategy is more likely to be optimal if 
𝑏 is small and 𝑐 is large. We analytically confirm these observations in the following proposition.  
 
Figure 4.  Results of Numerical Experiments 
 
Proposition 4. For all 𝑡 ∈ (0,1], there exists a cut-off value ?̂?(𝑡) ∈ (0,1) such that for all  𝑏 < ?̂?(𝑡), 
there exists another cut-off value  ?̂?(𝑡, 𝑏) ∈ (0,1) such that for all 𝑐 > ?̂?(𝑡, 𝑏) 
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑟𝑀
> 0 is true for all 𝑟𝑀 
within 0 and 1.  
Proposition 4 indicates that as long as the payment processing fee b is small enough, and the customer’s 
marginal cost c is large enough, we have 
∂𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑟𝑀
> 0 for all 𝑟𝑀 ∈ [0,1]. To understand this, note that if the 
bank is not charging a too high processing fee, it is easier for the mobile payment platform to profit from 
the merchants. Moreover, if the marginal cost for the customers to use the platform is high, the 
subsidization strategy for customers will be more needed to incentivize the customers to join the 
problem. In either case, the original strategy retains its advantages and remains optimal. 
Conclusions 
By leveraging the emergent mobile payment technology, we present a game-theoretic model featuring 
network externality to study a mobile payment platform’s pricing strategy. In the short run, we find the 
platform will have incentives to apply the “divide and conquer” strategy by having the merchants cross 
subsidizing customers to adopt the mobile payment service. This allows the platform to utilize the cross-
side network externality to charge per transaction fees from the merchants. With different technologies 
adopted, the implementation of this pricing strategy alters a little but is still in the same direction. In 
the long run, the subsidization strategy is suggested to be applied when the bank is not taking too much 
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processing fee, customers do not have a too high marginal cost of using the service, and the marginal 
consumption frequency does not increase slowly in the number of merchants. We hope these findings 
can provide a step forward of method to identify this new and promising market. 
Our study certainly has its limitations. First, it will be interesting to consider customer’s heterogeneity 
in the numbers of transactions made through mobile payment. The subsidization strategy may need be 
to tailored for different types of customers. Second, since the role played by banks may affect more than 
payment processing fee, their strategic decisions should also be taken into consideration. We also have 
not considered how competition among multiple wallet platforms may change the equilibrium. These 
extensions of our study call for future investigation. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. The derivative of (7) with respect to 𝑓𝐶 can be deduced as  
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑓𝐶
= −
2𝑓𝐶
𝑁(1−𝑟𝑀)
−
𝑟𝑀−𝑏
1−𝑟𝑀
+ 1 − 𝑐,  
which implies that an optimal solution must satisfy 
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑓𝐶
= 0, i.e., 𝑓𝐶 =
𝑁
2
(1 − 2𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑀𝑐 + 𝑏). We 
substitute this into (7) and then differentiate it with respect to 𝑟𝑀 to obtain  
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑟𝑀
 = 𝑠 +
𝑁
4(1−𝑟𝑀)
2  (1 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑀𝑐 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑀𝑐 − 𝑏). 
As 𝑏 + 𝑐 < 1, 
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑟𝑀
> 0  is always true, which implies that 𝑟𝑀 should be set as large as it can reach. We 
know 𝑛𝐶 = 1 − 𝜃
∗ = 1 − 𝑐 −
𝑓𝐶
𝑁(1−𝑟𝑀)
, which can be expressed as 
𝑛𝐶 = 1 − 𝑐 −
1 − 𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑀 + 𝑐𝑟𝑀 + 𝑏
2(1 − 𝑟𝑀)
. 
After we replace 𝑓𝐶 by 
𝑁
2
(1 − 2𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑀𝑐 + 𝑏). As 𝑛𝐶 is bounded above by 1, we obtain 𝑟𝑀
∗ =
1+𝑐+𝑏
2+𝑐
 as 
the maximum possible value. It can be easily verified that 0 < 𝑟𝑀
∗ < 1. Therefore, our optimal pricing 
strategy will be 𝑟𝑀
∗ =
1+𝑐+𝑏
2+𝑐
 and 𝑓𝐶
∗ =
𝑁𝑐
2+𝑐
(𝑏 − 1). 
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this proposition, all we need is to look at the sign of the first 
derivatives of 𝑟𝑀, |𝑓𝐶|, and 𝑢𝑊 with respect to each parameter. While almost all the signs of the first 
derivatives can be found trivially through direct observations, here we investigate only 𝑟𝑀  with 
respective to b and |𝑓𝐶| with respective to 𝑐. First, we have 
𝜕𝑟𝑀
𝜕𝑏
=
1−𝑐
(2+𝑏)2
> 0; second, we have 
𝜕|𝑓𝐶|
𝜕𝑐
=
2(1−𝑏)
(2+𝑏)2
> 0. This completes the proof.  
Proof of Proposition 3. We plug in 𝑓𝐶
∗ and 𝑟𝑀
∗  into (6) and obtain 𝑛𝐶 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑐 +
(1+𝑐+𝑏)−(2+𝑏)𝑏
1−𝑏
) = 1 
and 𝑛𝑀 =
1−𝑏
2+𝑐
∈ (0,1). 
Proof of Proposition 4. To examine 𝐻(𝑟𝑀) in (11) is positive when c is sufficiently large and b is 
sufficiently small, we put 𝑐 = 1 and 𝑏 = 0 into (11) to obtain 𝐻(𝑟𝑀) = 𝑟𝑀(2ℎ(𝑛𝑀) + 𝑟𝑀ℎ
′(𝑛𝑀)), which is 
positive for all 𝑟𝑀 ∈ [0,1]. We may then prove that 
𝜕𝑢𝑊
𝜕𝑟𝑀
> 0.  
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